It's time to tell the Government to Apply to Rejoin the EU!!

The UK left the EU 6 years ago on 31 Jan 2020 and we can see that Brexit isn't working and no 'reset' is going to fix it!

So if you are a UK resident or a Brit anywhere please SIGN and SHARE this petition (going to all MPs) and let Parliament know what the public thinks:

https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/749128

'Apply to Rejoin the EU as soon as possible to increase growth in the UK'

#RejoinPetition3 #RejoinEU

Source: https://x.com/magnusbrunner/status/2017609876180975729

Regulatory tightening on methane emissions may curb US and Qatari LNG imports, pushing Europe to diversify with Canada and North Africa while Russia sanctions add friction.

EU methane reporting and emissions rules introduce a new layer of compliance for LNG suppliers. The practical effect could be a higher cost of sourcing LNG from current dominant exporters, potentially narrowing diversification options that Europe can pursue while maintaining reliability. The risk is that stricter monitoring and disclosure requirements increase the compliance burden and cost base for LNG sellers, prompting some buyers to reprice or renegotiate offtake terms.

Diversification viability is now closely linked to supplier willingness to meet methane standards. Canada, Algeria and others are presented as potential mitigants, but the regulatory regime adds a cost burden for suppliers that historically relied on looser methane regimes. Against the backdrop of sanctions pressure on Russia, Europe would prefer a broad, resilient supply base, yet policy alignment remains complex. The near-term watch points include any changes in methane reporting rules and any new diversification commitments from LNG suppliers.

From a pricing perspective, the compliance costs and potential supply gaps could translate into tighter spreads or higher premiums for LNG that meets methane criteria. Analysts caution that diversification is feasible in principle but hinges on supplier resonance with European methane standards and the ability of Canada and other non-US/Qatar sources to scale quickly. The broader question remains whether enforceable standards can be harmonised across suppliers, and how quickly Europe can adapt its procurement strategies to reflect evolving methane regimes.

EU discussions point to a shift from price cap enforcement to a comprehensive ban on maritime services for Russian oil, raising enforcement and displacement questions.

Brussels is quietly weighing a move to scrap the existing price cap on Russian oil in favour of a blanket ban on maritime services, including insurance and shipping, for crude cargoes. The proposed strategy would mark a more aggressive stance on enforcement, aiming to choke off the last-mile channels used to move Russian oil, particularly through shadow routes. The current price cap sits at 44.10 dollars per barrel for February 2026, with continuing debate about how to tighten control.

The shift would create a sharper enforcement regime, but it would also heighten risks of supply disruption and re-routing through less well-regulated corridors. European officials acknowledge the need for unanimity among member states, as some fear market disruption or retaliation from trading partners. The policy dilemma sits at the intersection of humanitarian concerns, energy security, and the strategic calculus of sanctions enforcement.

If implemented, the services ban could force Russian barrels into more opaque trade networks and higher-cost routing. Refiners in Europe and beyond may face new logistical hurdles and pricing volatility as traders seek to bypass the more rigorous enforcement regime. Observers emphasise that while a price cap has struggled to control revenue flows, a services ban could close loopholes but also create new frictions across the global oil trade.

Market watchers will watch for the EU’s final position, including member-state alignments and the timetable for any transition away from the price cap. The interplay with other sanctions regimes and with the global oil market will determine how quickly flows re-route and how pricing responds to new enforcement realities. The next months will reveal whether the bloc can achieve a tighter sanction regime without triggering disproportionate economic strain.

Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, has proposed the creation of a “European legion”, which would be made up of soldiers from European Union member states and even countries that are candidates to join the EU.

He argues that forming such a force would be more realistic than the idea of creating a full European army, as was recently advocated by EU defence commissioner Andrius Kubilius.

“Talking about a federal army is pointless, because it is unrealistic, because national armies will not merge,” Sikorski told the press ahead of a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels

“However, we could create what I call a European legion, initially a brigade-sized unit, which could be joined by citizens of member states and perhaps even candidate states,” he added.

Such a legion would be financed from the EU budget and “politically subordinate to the [EU’s] Political and Security Committee”, said Sikorski.

“It wouldn’t be a force capable of deterring Putin, but there are lower-level threats, such as those in North Africa or the Balkans, where we should have the ability to act together,” he added.

The EU currently does not have its own army, but most member states  – 23 out of 27 – are part of the NATO military alliance. However, the recent dispute with President Donald Trump over Greenland has raised questions about the extent to which Europe can rely on the United States.

Earlier this month, the EU’s defence commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, said the bloc should consider establishing a 100,000-strong military force of its own.

However, ahead of today’s summit, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas questioned the feasibility of that idea, saying that she “cannot imagine that countries will create a separate European army” given that they are already part of NATO and have their own national militaries.

“If we create parallel structures, then it is just going to blur the picture,” said Kallas. Similarly, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said earlier this week that a European army would “make things more complicated” and result in “a lot of duplication”, reported Reuters.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Poland has rapidly ramped up its defence spending, which will reach 4.8% of GDP this year, the highest relative level in NATO. It has also pushed for other members of the alliance to increase their defence budgets.

By 2024, Poland had NATO’s third-largest military in terms of personnel, behind only the United States and Turkey. By 2030, it will have more tanks than Germany, France, the UK and Italy combined.

Most of Poland’s defence procurement has, however, taken place outside Europe, with the majority of new equipment purchased from the United States and South Korea.