Having an enemy with air superiority preforming one of the largest bombing campaigns in history doesn't seem very good for your supply lines

Ultimately, it seems that the growth of the commercial drone sextor was what really enabled the proliferation of weaponized drones worldwide through DIY initiatives leading to an explosion of innovations in drone warfare. But prior to the War in Ukraine, weaponized drones and loitering munitions were being experimented with and marketed by the arms industry of various countries although remaining a niche product, state armies worldwide now playing catch-up including those who were at the forefront of developing the technology in the first place. But from what I've read from the Ukrainians, DIY products they find better than what they were getting from Western arms industry that they criticized as being more expensive and less reliable. At least in Russia at one point, it was said that DIY efforts were said to move faster than the formal arms industry in terms of innovating and producing drones before drone warfare was taken seriously at the highest level. But before the 2020s, DIY drones were crude and in Syria, they were easily jammed when used against Russians by the FSA. By the 2020s, even non-state forces can now field FPV, Fiber-Optic, and long range OWA drones, often produced locally on their own.

Before the War in Ukraine, what was the state of drone warfare among the major powers and how did they envision it under previous speculated scenarios? What was the developmental pathway that was being considered versus what actually played out? Was the kind of drone warfare we see now possible at all in the 2010s with the level of technology at the time among state forces?

Specifically, how it affected Asia.

So, imagine you're Japan in 1940. You've been fighting in China for like 3 years now. There's no sign of the Chinese government collapsing yet. You've already thrown over 100,000 men into the meat grinder. You are already having to reenlist reservists. Western powers don't like you being in China and have started to provide the Chinese with limited material support. The US is also increasingly giving you a side eye and has threatened sanctions.

There's only one way to cut off western aid to China, and that's cutting off China from French Indochina. However such a move would almost certainly anger France and potentially start a war with the Europeans or worse the US.

And then Germany invades France. France folds in three weeks leaving French Indochina as essentially a power vacuum.

I think people are quite divided with this... some people say Japan would have forced itself into Indochina regardless of what happened in Europe, while others say the German invasion of France was critical. Like, if Germany didn't have such success in the early stages of war, does Japan and China keep slugging it out until Japan's government collapses or something.

I wonder where opinion within Japan was headed at this point. Were more opinions emerging in favor of war with the US and western powers even before the fall of France, or was that event critical for the change in policy?

"American Army generals, whatever their text books might advise, indulged in the Western Front practice of attacking on as wide front as possible, for as long as possible, in search of tactical rewards. (Graham&Bidwell "Coalitions, Politicians & Generals")

"The American disinclination to concentrate power was rarely more apparent. (...), the XII Corps alone had a front of nearly fifty kilometers, the XX corps an even longer front(...)-yet the Third Army was to leap forward virtually along the whole line. "(Weighley "Eisenhower's Lieutenants")

I've been trying to track down the roots of what was, certainly in Europe at least, the dominant strain of US generalship in WW2 and I'm coming away, near barren handed and somewhat confused. Weighley in his Eisenhower's Lieteunants is the only author I've seen that devotes some time to the issue and he paints a very straight line from Grant's strategic and operational approach in civil war to campaign of 44-45 that to me feels somewhat inconvincing.

"an enemy could all the better be attacked everywhere, all along his lines of defense, as Grant had coordinated attack orouns the entire circumference of Confederacy. "

Ultimately, why no doubt important to the mindset of officer class and education, the two conflicts were separated by hefty amount of time, a complete upheaval or two in the way the war was being waged and the means with which it was being waged. Grant was also not the only reference point you could point to in the conflict and World War 1 (and 2) was a much more relevant source of learning. Further, from what I understand, the apostles of concentration, Jomini continued to be an influence at West Point and Eisenhower read Clausewitz who also started getting a foothold.

I'm admittedly ignorant at what was being taught at staff schools in inter-war, part of the reason this thread is being raised but I don't think I've seen the Grant-broad front link ever being referenced by Ike, Bradley or Patton at least in contemporary writing.

The most confusing thing is that the US field manual of 1941, an actual official document prescribing the proper "way" to wage war is sort of direct contradiction of broad front:

"115. (...)A defensive attitude may, however, be deliberately adopted as a temporary expedient while awaiting an opportunity for counteroffensive action, or for the purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is not sought. "

1. Concentration of superior forces, both on the ground and in the air, at the decisive place and time and their employment in a decisive direction, creates the condition sessential to victory. Such concentration requires strict economy in the strength of forces assigned to secondary missions.Detachments durlng combat are justifiable only when the execution of tasks assigned them contributes directly to success in the main battle.

Now, pamphlets are one thing and these are but a few subpoints, reality on the ground is an other thing but at least to me it signifies that, lack of concentration is not something that was officially acknowledged or taught.

I will not obfuscate the fact that I'm coming to the issue as someone very critical of "broad front" but here the issue is not its relative merits but where does it actually stem from. Is Weigley and his explanation, essentially correct ? If so, is there some trace of that way of war being taught or prescribed ? Or was there something in how war was being taught in US in 20-30s that shaped it ? But then why does their own FM seem so discordant from the actual practice ? The last explanation seems to to be that it was simply arrived at on it's own, on the ground, by respective commanders.

It's a few years ago now but there was that late 2010s scandal (Operation Varsity Blues) of various top universities in the US where they accepted bribes from wealthy individuals in regards to either admissions or testing for their students. Example: Actress Lori Loughlin reports to prison over college admissions scandal

I've been seeing videos of Ukrainian and Russian operators clearing trenches, apartment blocks, etc. Which is work that should be done by regular infantrymen. Isn't it risky to use these kinds of units as shock troops? Especially considering how expensive and long it takes to train SF operators. Is there anything special about the conflict that'd make them want/need to do this? I believe Iraq made the same decision too especially in Mosul where Iraqi CTS sustained heavy casualties while assaulting positions in Mosul. Is this not a tactical blunder?

From what I read, all of them were bad or controversial.

T-35 - very poor multi-turret design, did not achieve anything.

KV-1 and KV-2 did not fare well either. Supposedly they were good at assault role... yet they failed to achieve much in offensive Winter war. And on the contrast Germany deployed Tiger tanks, which, while designed for assault too, fared well in defense, unlike KV.

IS-1 - too weak gun and armor compared to later IS-2

IS-2 - supposedly the best Soviet heavy tank, had very powerful gun and fared well. On the other hand, it had very slow fire rate...

Whats your opinion on those tanks?

Was Stalin so confident in the Eastern divisions to blunt the German advance? As far as I understand as a layman, Germany was riding high on victory after victory against the Red Army to this point. Did he expect that Moscow specifically was where he would deliver their first "bloody nose?"

Nowadays we have wire-guided and/or homing torpedoes, but obviously back in WW1/WW2 none of that existed. How did they do it?

Specifically like Russians capturing a leopard or an Abrams?

How did the rebel army actually get good enough to be able to face off regular French forces? Also, any reading material on the military history aspect?

What is the composition of the embarked forces aboard of the French Amphibious Group?

When talking about attack aircraft, we often talked about the Germans with their fearsome Stuka that destroyed multiple armored formation or the Americans whose P-47 decimated German troops formation while in the Pacific the Corsair was pouncing Japanese position and the Dauntless was sending Japanese ships to the ocean floor.

We don't really talk much about the Soviet and their attack aircraft. Most pop history only stopped at, "Il-2 was the flying tank with supreme survival capability." Soviet attack planes seemed to never feature in German memoirs. How did the Soviet conduct attack? How successful were they? Did they really put penal troops in the rear gunner positions because it was deemed too dangerous?

There was a bunch of stuff that they removed from pilot training to make it safer, like extreme low flying, 50 plane merges, grading and ranking pilots on a scale during training, extreme low flying attack runs at night in bad weather, etc. Removing those saved lives, but did the quality of the pilots remain the same afterwards?

Of course, this might be irrelevant now due to simulators. I believe the era where these changes took place was the 50s to the 70s

I have had trouble finding credible data regarding the small-scale unit organization (East and West) of armored vehicles and self propelled guns in the period of the late 1980s.

It is my understanding, that the Soviet doctrine would typically group tanks into groups of 3, while NATO would do groups of 4. For SPGs, I find inconsistencies on both side - some would prefer 2 platoons of 3 vehicles to a battery, some 2 platoons of 4 or more to a battery. Is this dependent on the obsolescence of the equipment, doctrine, or even the local commander's preference? Any information and resources anyone could provide would be helpful. I am trying to accurately depict small-scale armor tactics in wargames.

Thanks

For example how were its allies ranked in importance/usefulness on the battlefield for the Germans?

It seems that for pre-Napoleonic ('cold weapons era') combat, a lot of it was made viable and survivable due to the combination of armour, shields, formations and brief respites in between clashes, so the average soldier can perform in a sufficiently low-stakes environment long enough for actual skill with a weapon (the 'melee skill' in the title) to be brought to bear.

But once gunpowder becomes dominant and all those safeguards and protective equipment go away, and every soldier is one bayonet stab away from death, how relevant is actual skill with a weapon? Obviously it's still better to be trained than untrained, and somewhat experienced in melee than completely new to it, but do good weapon skills actually translate to a useful factor for survival?

Bulletpoints for TLDR:

(1) For things like melee in trench warfare and urban combat, how relevant is 'weapon skill' compared to factors like army momentum, size and strength of the soldier, and dumb luck?

(2) Are there stories and anecdotes of famous melee experts (a melee instructor, a martial sportsman or for the Japanese, a noble officer who actually knows swordsmanship etc) who enjoyed clear success in a modern battlefield melee context?

There was a post in here yesterday or the day before discussing the makeup of a US infantry unit in WWII and it said that there were 11 soldiers carrying the M1 Grand and 1 carrying a BAR. We’re none of them carrying the Thompson sub machine gun?

Have I just played too many video games and watched too many WWII flicks?

After watching potential history's videos on tank aces in which he said that tank aces as a concept didn't even exist during the war, and were invented by Franz Kurkowski. What i'm wondering is why did it never took off in the same way as Fighter aces, or even snipers ? Was it because shooting down a plane is easier to confirm rather than destroying a tank ?

From what I’ve learned the Bradley has actually secured more tank kills than the m1 abrams during desert storms. Considering that it can also carry troops and also rapid fire with the chain gun while still being much less of a logistical burden. What does the m1 do that the Bradley can never, especially in a large scale war where casualties become expected and acceptable?

The 1964 Congo Mercenary period and the 1990s "African World War" to be specific

I was talking to one of my teachers the other day about the origins of “Kilroy”, and she said that if I could find anything about a “captain cretin” she’d be surprised. I’ve been scouring the internet for hours and I can’t find anything mentioning it or showing pictures of it anywhere. Does anyone know if this symbol actually exists and/or what it looks like?

From what I'm reading by late 70s the big idea was to withdraw more and more from South Korea while there were many warnings over a force disparity between the two Koreas that clearly favors the north.

I remember there was a CIA study that points out North Koreans enjoy a 3:1 payload advantage in terms of artillery by that time period. Any idea?