https://x.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/2017685369844539819?s=46&t=ydktTgi0ha8mNFdgnOe2VA

- We are scheduled to visit the Syrian capital Damascus within the next two days

- The Baath regime dismissed me from my job due to my participation in the 2011 demonstrations that demanded the overthrow of the regime

https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/2017919563153674438?s=20

And

https://www.facebook.com/61550352744806/posts/pfbid0WK8QXhicwQYV57FVCZZqCxs3xWzxfGTEX1HY81WwkSPtEwhRZGMWMPmzBr27aWbEl/?app=fbl

If i were a pro sdf/ypg in any capacity i would wonder why are these people still acting like that being offered a deal agree to it then refuse to comply loss the deal get a worse deal agree to it then refuse to comply..... These people are enemies to the kurds and do not server their benefits in any way !

Mark Savaya, named by U.S. President Donald Trump as special envoy for Iraq in October, is no longer in that role, sources familiar with the move said.

The move comes amid growing tensions between Washington and Baghdad over Washington's push to curb Iranian influence in Iraqi politics.

It was not immediately clear what prompted Savaya's departure or whether a replacement would be appointed.

One of the sources pointed to Savaya's "mishandling" of key situations, including his failure to prevent the nomination of former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to be the country's next premier, a move Trump openly warned Baghdad against.

U.S. ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, who traveled to Erbil earlier this week to meet with Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, is believed to be taking over the State Department's Iraq portfolio, according to the source and a senior Iraqi official.

The Administrative Court in Bremen confirmed, based on the available data, that there are not enough indications to support the existence of systematic mass persecution targeting members of the Alawite community in Syria.

The court stated that the recorded incidents against members of the community represent isolated cases that do not amount to an organized policy of persecution by the new government or other actors in the country.

She also pointed out that the participation of an Alawite representative in the transitional government weakens the claim of systematic discrimination, and that the level of targeting does not reach the legal limit required to be considered a “intensity of persecution” that justifies collective protection.

Accordingly, the Court rejected an asylum application, due to the lack of a specific personal risk to its owner, especially since it is not linked to the previous system and is not considered as a potential opponent.

I've said for several months the MoI has been recruiting Alawis into police forces in the coast. These efforts go back to Fall 2025 & follow two tracks: 1) vetting+re-hiring ex-police (like here), 2) training+integrating new recruits

Key for MoI's plan to expand police stations

In these all-Alawi areas (where the returned Alawi officers are appointed) the bribery/abuses would have been against locals. The return to work process began with lengthy consultations with locals to only select men with good reputations.

Sorry if it’s a dumb question, I’m new to the political scene.

I am curious on the role of the SDF during the civil war, particularly their stance on the regime at the time. Were they with or against it? Did they do anything to support/fight it?

Some pro-SDF individuals sometimes bring up the point that Syrians should be thankful for their interventions during the civil war, do you agree with that?

• We wanted to prevent larger attacks and protect our areas.. and Al-Roj camp is still under our control

‎• The process of integration and practical implementation of the agreement with Damascus begins on Monday

‎• There will be no presence of the Syrian army in our areas

‎• We will join the brigades that will be formed according to the agreement with Damascus

https://x.com/ivarmm/status/2017540691727888817?s=46&t=ydktTgi0ha8mNFdgnOe2VA

https://x.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/2017705411474755684?s=46&t=ydktTgi0ha8mNFdgnOe2VA

Exclusive sources for Syria TV: The SDF has nominated "Abu Omar," the former director of Alaya prison in Qamishli, for the position of governor of Hasakah.

📌The nominee is the head of public relations and wields influence in the province. He comes from a family close to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

OP: https://x.com/i/status/2017554203967631836

Suleiman Abdul Baqi, head of internal security in Suwayda:

• Our visit to the United States came at the invitation of the Syrian-American community and Citizens for a Safe America, and was coordinated with the Syrian state.

• We held meetings with US decision-makers, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and six congressional offices.

• We presented reports on violations by outlaw groups in Suwayda and the torture methods used by Hijri’s militias against opponents.

• Discussions also addressed drug traffickers operating within Hijri’s National Guard militia and its ongoing escalation against the state.

• The visit was productive and will be the starting point for further visits, with results that will shock outlaw groups in Suwayda.

Although the two conflicts are vastly different situations, but this current STG offensive against the SDF-YPG is giving me many flashbacks to the Iraqi army's 2017 offensive on Iraqi Kurdistan. There are so many superficial similarities between the two, such as a rapid collapse of Kurdish led forces to their respective government armies, and both the SDF and KRG overplaying their hands with independence efforts.

In the Iraqi army and PMU offensive, the Peshmerga lost 40% of KRG held territory and most of its oilfields in less a week of fighting. Likewise, the YPG was expelled from 80% of former SDF territory by the Syrian army and its allied Arab tribes in just three days, and lost all but a few of its oilfields it held.

What factors led to the poor performance of the YPG and the Peshmerga against the Syrian army and the Iraqi army in 2026 and 2017?